Mr Speaker, as many in this House are aware, I was, for many years, an employee at a Bretton Woods institution, with which these two motions are associated. I declare, however, that while I maintain personal and professional relationships with staff at the World Bank—as well as a small balance in its retirement fund—I have no ongoing financial interest in the institution. This speech is therefore delivered in my capacity as a Singaporean parliamentarian.
The motions seek approval for grant support for the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) poverty reduction and growth trust (PRGT), to the tune of around $36 million for the trust fund, and a little less than $8 million for Sudan. The Fund has been engaged in poverty reduction work for several decades now, and while I personally find that this smacks of mission creep—especially relative to its mandate versus that of the Bank—I will concede that rendering help to the poorest nations on Earth need not be limited to one international agency alone.
My contribution to this debate, therefore, will be threefold: first, I will seek more clarity on the choice of parameters for support; second, I hope to obtain additional context for historical disbursements to the PRGT; and third, I will return to my call for a more institutionalized system for our nation’s foreign assistance.
Clarifications on the parameters of support
My first clarification has to do with the $36 and $8 million sought.
The amount for the PRGT contribution is likely to have been explicitly conveyed by the IMF, and would typically be consistent with our nation’s subscription quota in the institution. The amount for Sudan, under the auspices of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, is also presumably a proportional contribution to the total amount of debt relief that the country seeks. Still, I wish to ascertain that this is indeed how these specific amounts were arrived at.
Second, I have no doubt that Sudan is in severe need for debt relief. With a GDP per capita of around $1,250, the country is one of the poorest countries worldwide. The nation is faced with a debt of close to 2.5 times its income, and recent analyses strongly suggest that this amount is patently unsustainable.
Still, there are 39 countries presently listed on the HIPC list. This includes countries that are poorer—such as Afghanistan, Burundi, and Malawi—as well as those with equally crushing debt burdens, such as Eritrea. And while all but 2 countries on the HIPC list have previously enjoyed debt relief, Eritrea, like Sudan, has not. I would therefore like to understand the premise behind the selection of Sudan as the beneficiary of this round of relief. Of course, this may well have been recommended by staff of the Fund, but as donors, it is also incumbent on us to question the institution’s rationale.
Historical context for PRGT funding, and plans for the present tranche
Now, I am also aware that the amounts constitute maximums, which, in principle, may turn out not to be fully accessed. To this end, I note that, as of 2025, Singapore’s pledges to the PRGT amounted to $1.25 billion dollars. However, it is uncertain whether this amount has been fully disbursed. Will the Minister clarify the status of the prior pledged amounts? Specifically, has part or all of the earlier $1.25 billion been drawn down?
Relatedly, how do the current grants relate to our earlier commitments? After all, $36 million is a miniscule share—just 3 percent—of the prior $1.25 billion pledge. Why not simply tap on the earlier pool, if it has not been paid out in full? Or are the two buckets materially different, insofar as the $1.25 billion was a pledge that could be called on, whereas the present monies are grants that will, for sure, be tapped?
A repeated call for a SingAID agency
Finally, I return to my call, first made more than 3 years ago, for our official foreign development assistance be institutionalized.
The step wouldn’t even entail much of a budgetary impact. This would collect our routine IMF and IDA subscriptions, but also include a modest budget for a development fund to extend ad hoc aid, especially in the wake of economic crises or natural disasters. To avoid frivolous disbursements, we can rollover annual budget allocations that remain unspent, with no stipulation to exhaust funds in any given year.
Such a move would step away from arbitrary allocations and idiosyncratic motions, and subject such funding to our standard—and more professional—budget scrutiny mechanisms, such as the Public Accounts Committee and the annual Report of the Auditor-General.
As I previously explained, we have a history of efficiently running public agencies, which has plagued other agencies of this nature elsewhere. And if run effectively, it will serve to further enhance our soft power, in a global geopolitical environment where such power is in short supply, yet sorely needed.
[1] The PRGT is the Fund’s primary support program for low-incomecountries, and superseded the prior Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,which had been in place for about a decade, starting in 1999.
[1] The amounts sought are in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs),of $21 million and $4.48 million, respectively. They have been converted toSingapore dollars, at prevailing exchange rates, for ease of context.
[1] These rely on the World Bank’s estimates of nominal GDP, and areconverted from U.S. dollars at the current exchange rate (of USD 989); theequivalent IMF estimate is even lower, at around $898 (USD 712).
[1] FRED (2025),Total Government Debt for General Government of Sudan, St Louis: FederalReserve Bank of St Louis.
[1] IDA & IMF (2020),Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis, Washington, DC:International Development Association and International Monetary Fund.
[1] Paris Club (2026),List of 39 Eligible Countries to HIPC Initiative, Paris: Secrétariat duClub de Paris.
[1] The pledged amount is 0.7 billion SDR. See IMF (2025),“2025 Update of Resource Adequacy of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust,Resilience and Sustainability Trust, and Debt Relief Trusts,” IMF PolicyPaper, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
[1] Hansard (2023)95(80): Jan 10.
[1] I had also humbly suggested that such an agency may be termed theSingapore Assistance for International Development, or SingAID.
