Mr Speaker,
Scams are a scourge on our society. There has been progress made in public education efforts, but an unfortunate situation has arisen where most of us know someone who refuses to answer phone calls from unknown numbers or decides against using internet banking services out of an abundance of mistrust, for fear of being scammed.
This is against a decline in the number of reported scam cases and amount lost to scams, breaking the upward trend recorded from 2021 to 2024. The SPF’s 2025 Scams and Cybercrime Brief, reported a 27.6% drop in scams compared with 2024, and an approximately 17.92% decrease in the total amount lost to scams within that same period. Yet the problem is still sizeable, as Second Minister for Home Affairs Sim Ann pointed out during the second reading of the Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Offences) Bill last year, between 2020 and the first half of 2025 scams comprised approximately 60% – an outright majority – of all crimes reported to the Police.
The scam mitigation and enforcement efforts set out in this Bill are important, but we have to ensure that we tackle the problem on all fronts, and that the measures enacted, especially those which involve law enforcement intervention, are fair, transparent and understandable to the general public. Crucially, our anti-scam efforts should do more to target dismantling the networks and systems that fuel such crimes, providing restitution to victims, and ensuring that communities are well-equipped to guard themselves against scams.
Enforcement efforts
This Bill strengthens the government’s arsenal of anti-scam enforcement tools.
Clause 7 introduces two new Orders which law enforcement can issue to service providers, whether they are banks, payment services, telecommunications companies, or online service providers. An Account Disabling Order requires service providers to disable specific accounts for anti-scam purposes, while a Service Limitation Order – which builds on the provisions set out in the Facility Restriction Framework – mandates service providers restrict a specified user from using a scam-enabling service.
At the same time, Clause 19 of the Bill allows a responsible officer to use computer programs to issue a Part 2 direction under the Online Criminal Harms Act. Such programs may also involve the usage of Artificial Intelligence to flag suspicious accounts. This matches the call in the Workers’ Party’s 2025 manifesto, which specifically asked for AI to be used to detect suspicious transactions. The idea is that such programmes increase efficiency in combating scammers who themselves turn to technology to perpetuate their crimes, and it is one which should be supported. Such identification of potential cybercrime-enabling accounts via AI tools can aid authorities in their fight to limit or prevent damage being dealt, but necessary guardrails and ultimately human oversight must be put in place.
Any usage of AI tools – especially within law enforcement contexts – must be done in cognisance of the potential for unfair bias against marginalised groups, an issue that I previously raised when debating the motion on Singapore’s AI transition. Such AI-enabled tools are also known to throw up false positives. For instance, the New York Times reported in July this year that when Meta deployed AI tools to detect accounts flouting its terms of service, many accounts belonging to small business owners and even non-profits were wrongfully banned and some deleted, with their appeals turned down. This affected livelihoods and operations, with Meta eventually acknowledging that mistakes were made and restored some accounts after The Times inquired after the incidents.
This example highlights a potential pitfall of purely using AI to enforce any rule or regulation, especially when it appears that no human oversight was available to appeal against decisions that those affected claimed were erroneous. In the case of Clause 19, although it is explicitly noted that responsibility for the results and actions taken by the computer program would be borne by a “responsible officer”, could the minister elaborate on the processes in place to ensure that the deployment of such computer programs would be fair and accurate, and also clarify about how human oversight and review plays into the operation of such decisions.
The powers granted to law enforcement – while having the well-intentioned aim of tackling scams and cybercrime – should also be open to independent scrutiny by both Parliament and members of the public.
In this vein, would the government release a report annually detailing key metrics and indicators such as the total number of Service Limitation, Account Disabling, and Disclosure Orders issued, as well as the error rates of automated directives, appeal volumes, and the average resolution timelines for false positives, for citizens to better understand the action and efforts behind our efforts against scams?
Protecting One’s Bank Account details
Clause 6 of the Bill expands on the provisions of the Protection from Scams Act by granting law enforcement the ability to order banks to furnish information, such as the name, contact details, and residential addresses of users whose accounts are subject to a Restriction Order, something which was previously disallowed under the Banking Act.
The new Subsection 5A(c) also allows for the disclosure of “any other prescribed information”. Could the minister clarify what other information is envisioned by this catch-all clause? And more generally, how does this new power balance against our wider financial ecosystem, in particular the principle of banking secrecy?
Enforcement
Moving to enforcement and the new powers under Clause 7 introducing Service Limitation and Account Disabling orders to the Protection from Scams Act. Even as we assume that executive powers would be exercised carefully and responsibly, these orders imposed on an innocent party or unwitting mule would be at least be a mild inconvenience, and at worst debilitating to daily life. Individuals who have their accounts frozen might end up unable to receive salaries, or to foot the cost of their daily necessities and medical bills if their sole bank or e-wallet account is completely frozen. In the case of businesses – especially smaller proprietors – this might cause business operations to grind to a halt and result in the non-payment of employees.
On this specific concern, a Parliamentary Reply from September last year noted that persons whose accounts are blocked under the facility restriction framework could still have access to basic banking services, receive payments such as their salary and government benefits, as well as withdraw and deposit money at physical bank branches. Would this principle be retained with the enactment of this Bill into law?
The minister also stated in another Parliamentary Reply this year that graduated restrictions are not being prioritised due to the need for significant system upgrades and changes. The same reply noted that banks expeditiously review and facilitate each request by holders of accounts subject to a Restriction Order to withdraw funds, and that the police approved all requests made to withdraw money for daily responses. Could the minister shed light on the average processing time for approved requests to withdraw funds from bank accounts subject to a Restriction Order, and how would the government work with banks towards eventually developing a system that allows for graduated restrictions?
Victim Restitution
Our anti-scam efforts should also be more victim-centred. For instance, the current Shared Responsibility Framework (or SRF) requires banks and telecommunications companies to bear the full cost of losses arising from a scam should they fail to carry out their responsibilities according to the Framework, else the cost would be fully borne by the victim.
This does not consider enough that other parties within the ecosystem, such as social media and messaging service companies, also play a very crucial part in stamping out scams. SPF’s Brief on Scams and Cybercrime noted that social media and messaging services were the highest and second highest methods of contact adopted by scammers.
While the Code of Practice governing social media and messaging services was recently updated, this Bill raises the penalties for service providers who fail to comply. We can and should do more to hold social media and messaging services responsible for their action – or inaction – in our fight against scams.
Additionally, the SRF also needs to be more sensitive to the needs of the consumer, who is likely to be in a far weaker position should they have to bear losses arising from the scam.
In a multi-pronged approach, jurisdictions worldwide are looking to victim reimbursement systems. For instance, the United Kingdom has mandated that payment service providers refund banks up to £85,000 if a victim reported that they were subject to a scam, unless the victim was grossly negligent or did not provide the payment service provider with all the information required for their investigations. The victim might also have to foot a £100 excess, depending on which provider they claim from.
Australia is also planning to implement a similar scheme, with a lower cap of A$3,000 and with responsibility shared equally between the banks, telecommunications companies, and social media platforms.
Such an approach seems to be working. An independent study of the UK’s system found a decrease in the number of fraud cases and the total amount lost to fraud involving Faster Payments (our FAST equivalent) transfers. This also forced banks to step up their anti-scam measures by hitting them directly in the wallet.
Therefore, I would like to repeat the call contained in the Workers’ Party’s 2025 manifesto to have an insurance scheme to cover losses from scams, with a consumer liability cap of up to $500 and to look into a Scam Victim Restitution Fund financed by recovered funds.
Disrupting the Scam-enabling Ecosystem
Mr Speaker, while the provisions under this Bill are largely centred around mules, we must dedicate more of our energy and resources towards dismantling the vast money laundering infrastructure that enables scams to flourish.
According to the latest Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) mutual evaluation report on Singapore’s AML efforts, domestic low-ranking money mules comprise the majority of Singapore’s AML investigations and convictions, despite other stakeholders within the wider ecosystem facilitating and benefiting from such ill-gotten gains, such as professional enablers and the masterminds, playing a significant role in such operations.
I believe this is best summed up by a young money mule who was apprehended back in 2021, when he was just 17 years old. He noted that, quote, “I am just a pawn…But there is always a queen and a king. They are never going to get caught because they are going to have people before them that will get caught.”
I could not have put this better myself. It is also concerning that the task force’s report noted that sanctions against natural persons convicted of money laundering – consisting of either a fine of up to SGD $500,000, or 10 years’ jail time, or both – while proportionate, were deemed neither effective nor dissuasive.
I hope that this will be addressed when the government studies the implementation of the FATF’s recommendations.
Another recommendation prescribed by the Report is for the authorities to diversify sources for scam-detection. The Report notes that 82% of Singapore’s money laundering investigations arose from police reports filed by victims of cyber-enabled fraud, a stark contrast to the 2% from financial and other intelligence sources. In view of this, can the minister clarify how our law enforcement agencies intend to step up their proactive identification of money laundering offences via financial intelligence?
We can also work towards strengthening our financial intelligence-sharing capabilities, especially amongst banks. Since its inception in 2024, COSMIC – the MAS’ customer information sharing platform aimed at curbing financial crime – has helped in closing over 1,000 suspicious customer accounts, with Suspicious Transaction Reports filed for up to $1.6 billion in aggregate fund flows, according to the response to a PQ I filed just last month. As we look to expand COSMIC, participation in the programme by all financial institutions should eventually be mandatory rather than voluntary, thus strengthening our corpus of financial intelligence.
Public Education
Finally beyond enforcement, our anti-scam efforts should also target segments of the population such as those who are less digitally savvy. Despite accounting for about 14.8% of victims in 2025, elderly scam victims lost an average of approximately $42,347 from scams during the first half of 2026, up from $35,374 over the same period in 2025, leaving them in a financially precarious state.
The minister in May this year noted that approximately 40% of senior scam victims fell victim to impersonation scams, where scammers posed as government officials and prominent figures to extort money from them. One instance, over 6.1 million Singapore dollars were lost to scammers impersonating ICA or Chinese officials, while another case involved a scammer extorting around $600,000 by posing as Elon Musk.
Given this, could the minister clarify how the government is reviewing anti-scam efforts, such as the SG Cyber Safe Seniors programme, to ensure that it is up to date with the latest developments and maximises its reach amongst the elderly.
In conclusion, as we step up our anti-scam enforcement efforts, the expansion and use of these law enforcement powers, while helpful, should be made clear to the public. We must also look beyond mules, target the complex money laundering infrastructure that sustains scams, and adopt a multi-pronged approach towards tackling scams beyond enforcement
Members of the public rely on law enforcement to defend and take action against scams. Knowing and understanding how these powers are used will only bolster public confidence in our law enforcement, and go towards addressing the many concerns that the public has about the scams plaguing our society. Thank you.
