Mr Speaker,
This Bill proposes to lower consent thresholds for developments of different ages, streamline certain procedures pertaining to strata sales, and clarify provisions for collective sales in complex cases. I believe this lowering of consent thresholds is the most consequential from a national, public policy perspective, and I will confine my remarks to this area.
The Bill deals with two fundamental principles, which both lie at the heart of modern capitalism: property rights and urbanisation. First, we wish to ensure the security of rights over property, in this case, real estate. Evidence shows that protection from expropriation of property can affect economic growth in the long run. Efforts that weaken these rights should thus only be undertaken under certain circumstances.
Pulling against this is how urbanisation has become a core part of modernisation, and urban renewal is central to the continued vibrancy of cities. Vibrant cities promote creativity, foster knowledge, and spur economic activity. A small handful of owners who hold out, even for justifiable reasons, may end up causing regions to fall behind, with knock-on adverse effects on the district, and also country.
Both of these principles are thus important and necessary. Our debate today should consider how we balance these competing interests, and to minimise the impact on the minority who disagree, and may otherwise feel bullied into having to accept the decision of the majority.
My Sengkang colleague Jamus Lim had in the 2024 Committee of Supply debates, suggested lowered consent thresholds as a property’s lease winds down, with 75% supermajority for a remaining 50-year lease, and a simple majority for one when the lease has just 25 years to go. The lowered thresholds would only apply for sufficiently old leases, and to me, this makes sense in the name of urban renewal, because decisions for upkeep and maintenance of property would ultimately be affected with an eye on the number of years left in a lease.
The proposed new thresholds in the Bill retain the existing threshold of 90 and 80% for titles less than 10 and 40 years old, but we now add a new, lower 70% threshold for leases between 40 and 60 years old, and another 65% level for developments over 60 years old.
Owners of properties who may have expected to hold on to their homes for the indefinite future – that is, those of 999 year and freehold leases – will, with these new, lower thresholds, be subject to greater uncertainty of a potentially early lease termination. In such cases, the individual property rights run more forcefully against the public interest.
A Parliamentary Question filed in 2025, indicated that approximately 14 percent of landed housing stock sit on 999 year leases, and 73 percent on freehold leases. Could the Minister clarify what this percentage is for non-landed private properties, to give us a better idea of the effect that the changes will have on existing properties?
A second concern is how we deal with owners who, under the new rules, might be compelled to sell their flats despite being unwilling to do so, because the relevant threshold was reached.
When we discuss this, it is helpful to consider the two main reasons leaseholders may not wish to sell:
First, those who hold out in the hope of getting a higher price. We can assume that their resistance is a financial one, and that if the price is high enough, they would eventually agree to sell. In these cases, redevelopment would eventually go ahead, and developers and contractors would just have to deal with the possibility of lower profits.
Second, those who may feel there are no housing alternatives. They may be elderly, in poor health, or vulnerable in other ways. Whatever we think of the reasons they are holding out, they may feel that they are being dispossessed of their home against their will. For them, no amount of money would truly be able to make up for that loss.
This is where the government can be more proactive. The recent removal of the 15-month wait-out period to purchase HDB flats will certainly help these owners to find a new home. But can the Minister clarify:
What specific bridging support or relocation assistance will be extended to elderly or vulnerable minority owners who did not consent to the sale, but are nonetheless compelled to give up their primary home under these lowered thresholds?
Additionally, will the government establish a dedicated, independent mediation mechanism, together with a proper framework of financial and psychological support, to accompany this legislation?
Transition support cannot simply only be measured in just dollars and cents. Feelings and the well-being of such owners are also important. Psychologists have noted that moving house is a highly stressful life event. Being made to move against one’s will would undoubtedly make the experience even harder. There is an emotional toll that is extracted from them, which cannot be measured by or compensated away with money.
Mr Speaker, an additional effect is that these new thresholds also have implications on urban renewal of our PUBLIC housing stock, especially giving upcoming programmes such as the Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme (VERS). While details of VERS are still unavailable today, I believe we should similarly think about how we balance the interests of displaced residents against the need for urban renewal, which will be especially pertinent in the case of public housing. The question about whether the staggered, new lowered thresholds will be ported over to public housing in the form of VERS is already a question that was asked last month in the Business Times.
The proportion of lower-income elderly with few other options is only likely to increase in the case of public housing. Many HDB flat owners decided to buy their flats decades ago with an eye to live in those units for the remainder of their time on this earth. This is especially for those who may have only bought one flat in their entire lifetime, or those who downgraded, buying a flat that they believed would be their final home.
This raises a natural question: it is not too early to ask what redevelopment strategy will VERS adopt. Would VERS be done at a cluster level rather than block-by-block basis, as was previously suggested by the minister? If so, how would the thresholds be calculated?
Even amongst existing public housing redevelopment schemes, how thresholds are calculated differ. The Home Improvement Programme requires 75% support in each block, while the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme takes a cluster view of the threshold. To help the public understand why this is the case, we should clearly explain the reasoning behind such differences, including for VERS.
While such questions may be argued to go beyond the direct scope of the Bill before us, we must take note if there is a chance that if the principles voted upon today will carry over to how we design VERS. Would property age-linked voting thresholds apply to VERS as well, and what does the government envisage the starting thresholds to be? Does Minlaw work with MND to use lessons learnt to inform its design of the details that will eventually comprise VERS? This is even more important for lessons learnt beyond dollars and cents.
A 70% threshold for flats between 40 and 60 years old may already be a high bar to clear. This is especially if you consider that for public housing, displacement would be even more disruptive, particularly for residents who bought their flats with no intention of moving again.
There is a further complication. Unlike private en bloc sales, where premium over valuation can be substantial, the government has already signalled that this would probably not be so for VERS. This may mean that HDB flat owners may be even more reluctant to sell. We saw this during the Ang Mo Kio SERS episode, where some owners were concerned to hear that they had to pay cash in order to buy a replacement flat of the same size nearby, even though the economics may have ultimately worked in their favour.
Relocation assistance for those who vote against a VERS redevelopment will thus be an important safeguard. This could take the form of a dedicated department within HDB that matches these families with replacement housing in other mature estates not slated for redevelopment. This can be done just as HDB already manages its stock of sale-of-balance flats, open booking flats, or even rental units.
Mr Speaker, this Bill is consequential for more than one reason. It does not just set out a voting framework to govern the redevelopment of private housing in Singapore. The decisions we make today may also be a precedent for how we handle ageing public housing stock, which make up a supermajority of how we house our citizens.
Today's debate should thus not foreclose a fuller, separate examination of the parameters that should apply to VERS and public housing redevelopment when that time comes. The considerations at play there will be different, and they deserve to be considered on their own terms.
