Mr Speaker, before I begin, I declare my interest as a Consultant in a law firm specialising in shipping and maritime matters. As a practitioner, I have seen how technological change, digitalisation and growing regulatory complexity have transformed the maritime industry over the past three decades. It is therefore understandable that the Government seeks to update the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Act for a very different operating environment from that which existed in 1996, the year the MPA Act came into force and the year I started work.
The Bill introduces significant changes, including a new cybersecurity regime, a framework for emerging technologies, stronger intervention powers and enhanced investigative powers. My comments today focus on a common theme: as Parliament modernises the law and grants MPA broader powers, we must ensure that accountability keeps pace with innovation.
Emerging Technologies: Autonomous Vessels and Remote Operations
Mr Speaker, I begin with the Bill's treatment of autonomous and remotely operated vessels. Few would disagree that Singapore must embrace innovation if we are to remain a leading global maritime hub. Autonomous vessels, remote operations and artificial intelligence have the potential to improve productivity, safety and operational efficiency. However, innovation should not create accountability gaps.
Much of maritime law assumes that a master and crew are physically on board a vessel, exercising judgment and taking responsibility for navigational decisions. Concepts such as negligence, fault, due diligence and seaworthiness rest upon identifiable human actions and decisions.
As autonomous systems become more prevalent, the key challenge is not whether vessels can operate autonomously. It is whether our legal framework continues to provide a clear chain of accountability when decision-making is increasingly distributed between masters, remote operators, remote operations centres and automated systems.
Part 4 of the Bill addresses this challenge. Clauses 25, 26 and 29 introduce a framework for remote operations centres, remote pilotage and vessels operated remotely or autonomously.
Mr Speaker, I understand that under the recently adopted non-mandatory International Code of Safety for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships, or MASS Code, the master remains responsible for the vessel even where operations are conducted remotely from a remote operations centre. The Code also places significant emphasis on the human element, human oversight, risk assessment and the governance of remote operations centres. It seeks to ensure that autonomous and remotely operated vessels achieve a level of safety equivalent to that expected of conventional vessels.
May I seek the Minister’s assurance that the regulations to be made under clause 26 will draw upon these principles? This would be a sensible starting point as it would avoid any type of vessel or even maritime device operating without any identifiable person bearing responsibility.
An important issue besides legal responsibility is competency. Operating a vessel remotely requires far more than technical familiarity with a control system. Masters and officers today are expected to possess working knowledge of Collision Regulations (or COLREGs), vessel traffic management procedures, port regulations and the wider body of international maritime rules governing vessel operations. Technological proficiency must not become a substitute for maritime competence.
This is particularly relevant to remote pilotage which is also a subject of the Bill. Traditionally, a harbour pilot boards a vessel and relies on years of experience handling different classes of ships in a variety of operating environments. The move towards remote pilotage therefore raises an important question of safety and competence.
A pilot physically present on the bridge has direct situational awareness of the vessel's surroundings, immediate communication with the master and bridge team, and firsthand appreciation of the traffic, weather and sea conditions affecting the vessel.
Studies on remote pilotage have consistently identified situational awareness as a key challenge, as shore-based pilots must rely on cameras, sensors and communications systems rather than direct observation of conditions around the vessel and inside the bridge, for which technology may not fully replicate.
The International Maritime Pilots’ Association (IMPA) reported from its study on remote pilotage in September 2025 that important challenges relating to system redundancy, situational awareness and collision avoidance remain before remote pilotage can be safely deployed in mandatory pilotage areas.
Studies by Scandinavian researchers examining remote pilotage operations, and by IMPA with the Canadian Coast Guard, the National Centre of Expertise on Maritime Pilotage and the Lloyd's Register have similarly highlighted concerns relating to bridge-team coordination, shared situational awareness and communications resilience. The findings may be particularly relevant in a congested port environment such as Singapore.
A recent study in Finland found that remote pilotage is cognitively more demanding and that, as visual and social information decreases, the significance of errors may be heightened.
De Beke advised in a separate study that to ensure minimum safety, remote pilotage services should not be offered in fairways with high vessel traffic frequency.
Communications and connectivity including time lag also appear to remain key challenges. If remote pilotage is to be used in safety-critical situations, how will MPA ensure sufficient system redundancy and resilience in the event of communications failures, degraded connectivity or equipment malfunction including where this may be caused from the ship’s end?
Remote pilotage may offer efficiency and manpower benefits. Can I ask the Minister to share with the House what are MPA’s plans for remote pilotage? Can I also ask the Minister to assure the House that taking the pilot off the bridge will not compromise pilotage standards or increase the risk of navigational incidents in Singapore's exceptionally busy port waters, where vessels operate in close proximity around the clock?
Before remote pilotage is deployed more widely, what assessments, trials and safety benchmarks has MPA relied upon to satisfy itself that remote pilotage is at least as safe and effective as conventional pilotage in Singapore's exceptionally busy port waters?
Maritime Devices, Drones and Artificial Intelligence
The Bill also introduces the new concept of a maritime device under section 2A. According to the MPA press release dated 6 October 2026, the Bill seeks to provide the legal basis for regulating emerging technologies such as aerial drones and artificial intelligence in maritime operations.
Clause 9 defines 'maritime device' and provides examples involving underwater inspection and hull-cleaning machines. However, it is not immediately apparent that aerial drones fall within this definition. Could the Minister clarify which specific provisions of the Bill are intended to provide the legal basis for regulating aerial drones used in maritime operations?
This in turn raises an important issue of regulatory coordination. Aerial drones operating in the maritime environment may simultaneously engage MPA's interests in port safety and operational continuity, and CAAS' interests in aviation safety and airspace management. Can the Minister elaborate on how the respective regulatory frameworks of MPA and CAAS will interact? Will operators face separate approval, licensing or competency requirements, or do the agencies envisage coordinated approvals, shared safety assessments or some form of mutual recognition?
There should be no gap between maritime and aviation regulation. Equally, legitimate operators should not be burdened by duplicate regulatory requirements addressing the same risks.
Mr Speaker, artificial intelligence raises a different issue. The MPA press release states that the Bill is intended to provide the legal basis for regulating the safe use of artificial intelligence in maritime operations. However, unlike autonomous vessels, maritime devices and unmanned aircraft, artificial intelligence does not appear to be the subject of any specific statutory definition or dedicated regulatory framework within the Bill itself.
Could the Minister clarify which provisions of the Bill are intended to provide that legal basis and how MPA envisages regulating the use of artificial intelligence in maritime operations?
Where AI is used in safety-critical navigation or operational decision-making, investigators must be able to determine how decisions were made and whether meaningful human intervention remained possible. I therefore suggest that standards developed under the Bill address audit trails, human override capabilities and the preservation of operational data following incidents.
Cybersecurity and Maritime Resilience
I next turn to cybersecurity. Mr Speaker, clause 4 inserts a new Part 13B establishing a cybersecurity framework for the maritime sector. Section 89K defines "important information infrastructure" by reference to the criteria in section 89N, the designation provision. Systems already designated as critical information infrastructure under the Cybersecurity Act 2018 are excluded.
Cybersecurity is undoubtedly critical. A serious cyber incident could disrupt trade flows and port operations just as effectively as a physical incident. The Government has explained that the aim is to safeguard the systems supporting the safe, reliable and efficient operation of our port. The challenge is to achieve that without imposing disproportionate burdens on smaller operators.
I therefore ask three questions. First, how will the section 89N criteria be applied in practice, and how will this regime sit alongside the Cybersecurity Act 2018?
Second, as individual designations need not be published, will MPA nevertheless report annually the aggregate number and broad categories of systems designated, together with the number of incidents reported, audits conducted and directions issued, without disclosing security-sensitive details?
Third, what compliance burden does MPA expect this framework to impose on businesses across the maritime value chain, particularly SMEs, and how has MPA assessed that burden?
Cybersecurity should of course strengthen Maritime Singapore, but at the same time, it should not create barriers for smaller businesses who lack the resources of multinational corporations. This raises a broader question of proportionality. Part 13B contemplates obligations such as audits, risk assessments and reporting requirements for operators of important information infrastructure. While such measures may be entirely justified for major port operators and other critical infrastructure, their impact may be felt differently by smaller maritime businesses.
Smaller businesses may not have the cybersecurity resources available to larger multinational corporations. Besides compliance costs arising from audits and assessments, will there also be supply-chain requirements imposed by larger entities dealing with designated infrastructure?
Can the Minister clarify whether MPA intends to adopt a risk-based and scalable approach to compliance, taking into account the size, operational complexity and risk profile of different maritime businesses? Will support schemes such as the Maritime Cluster Fund be available to help smaller operators build cybersecurity capabilities and meet regulatory requirements?
Finally, a jurisdictional question. Clause 3 extends information requirements to computer systems used on or in relation to vessels, and section 89L even reaches owners of vessels intending to enter Singapore waters. How does MPA intend to enforce these obligations against foreign owners and operators with only a temporary presence here? The effectiveness of this framework will depend not only on its scope, but on its enforceability.
Port Development Powers and Property Rights
Mr Speaker, I would also like to address the new powers relating to port expansion and development. I understand why such powers may be required as Singapore develops Tuas Port and modernises supporting infrastructure.
Nevertheless, these powers may affect private landowners, occupiers and facility operators whose premises become subject to statutory directions. While the Bill provides compensation and appeal mechanisms, can the Minister elaborate on the safeguards that will ensure such powers are exercised proportionately and only where genuinely necessary?
Enforcement Powers and Safeguards
Finally, I turn to the Bill's enhanced investigative and intervention powers. The Bill strengthens MPA's ability to obtain and verify information, conduct inspections and intervene where abandoned vessels, wrecks or other hazards threaten navigational safety, the marine environment or port operations. These powers serve an important public purpose. However, stronger powers should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, review mechanisms and standards of proportionality.
Can the Minister clarify who may authorise warrantless entry, seizure of electronic devices and demands for access credentials, and what internal safeguards and records will govern the exercise of these powers?
Where commercially sensitive information is involved, how will MPA ensure that requests for information remain proportionate to the regulatory purpose being pursued?
The Bill also strengthens MPA's powers to intervene where abandoned vessels, wrecks and other objects create risks to navigation, port operations or the marine environment. I can understand why MPA may require broader powers to act quickly without waiting for disputes over liability or ownership to be resolved.
However, where intervention costs are substantial and the responsible owner is a foreign entity, insolvent, or otherwise difficult to pursue, what practical mechanisms does MPA have to recover those costs? What has been MPA's experience in recovering such costs in practice, and to what extent does it rely on insurers, security posted by shipowners or claims against the vessel itself? What practical difficulties under the existing statutory framework have led MPA to seek these enhanced powers?
Mr Speaker, in Mandarin please:
议长先生，我支持这项法案, 因为海事行业正面对自动船只、远程操作、人工智能和网络安全等新挑战。如果新加坡要继续保持世界领先海事中心的地位，法律和监管框架也必须与时俱进。
不过，我有四点关注。
第一，是责任问题。如果发生事故、系统故障，或者人工智能作出错误判断，最终应由谁负责？责任界限必须清楚。
第二，是远程操作员和远程引航员的资格要求。操作船只不仅需要科技知识，更需要航海经验和专业判断。我们必须确保远程引航不会影响航行安全。
第三，是人工智能的透明度。如果人工智能参与导航或操作决策，发生事故后能否查明系统如何作出决定？人类又能否及时介入？
第四，是网络安全。新的要求在提升网络韧性的同时，也必须避免对中小企业造成过重负担，并保障商业资料和数据安全。
总的来说，创新固然重要，但问责、安全和透明度也必须跟上科技发展的步伐。
议长先生，创新必须与问责并行，发展必须与安全并重。在这个基础上，我支持这项法案。
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr Speaker, as we modernise the MPA Act, innovation must be accompanied by accountability and public confidence, cybersecurity must remain proportionate, and commercially sensitive information must remain protected.
Mr Speaker, notwithstanding my concerns and clarifications, I support the Bill.
