Mr Deputy Speaker,
Every time transboundary haze returns, Singaporeans endure burning throats, stinging eyes and disrupted routines. Yet, the commercial incentives driving this public health hazard remain unchanged.
For errant agribusinesses, draining peatlands without proper water management and cutting corners on fire prevention and suppression is often an expedient, low-cost operational shortcut, with fires and the occasional fines treated as an acceptable business risk.
I therefore welcome the long-overdue overhaul of the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act. If we want companies to stop these environmentally destructive practices, the commercial calculations behind them must be fundamentally upended. We must use the financial and legal levers available within our own jurisdiction to ensure our markets and supply chains are not facilitating such reckless and negligent operations.
Enhanced Criminal Penalties
The Bill makes significant changes to the criminal penalties framework, including raising the maximum aggregate criminal fine tenfold, from $2 million to $20 million. However, I remain sceptical about the real-world effectiveness of the enhanced criminal penalties. Will it simply be a paper tiger?
Since the Act was passed in 2014, the statutory criminal prosecution framework has produced a grand total of zero convictions. During the severe 2015 haze crisis, the National Environment Agency (NEA) served statutory notices on six Indonesian plantation companies. Two of those cases were closed in 2017 without any penalties levied. The remaining four cases remain open and unresolved over a decade later.
The fundamental evidentiary hurdle is proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt across sovereign borders.
I acknowledge that the Bill does introduce important procedural upgrades that make enforcement and conviction more feasible in court.
Deeming all offences under Section 14A arrestable and conferring powers of arrest without warrant may sound decisive, but in practice, they will have little impact on foreign companies whose directors never step foot in Singapore.
Even with the Bill's statutory presumptions and the Director-General’s conclusive certificate establishing the risk of haze, proving corporate culpability and ownership beyond reasonable doubt across borders is an exceptionally high bar—and likely quite impossible without sufficient cooperation from the Indonesian government or any other government involved.
While the Bill attempts to tackle corporate layering and causation through expanded liability under Section 5 and statutory presumptions under Section 8, these legal mechanisms remain rebuttable in court. They cannot unilaterally pierce offshore corporate webs, resolve contested boundary claims on foreign soil or substitute for ground-level evidentiary cooperation from our neighbours.
Back in 2013, before the principal Act was passed, I raised a parliamentary question on the sharing of cross-border concession maps to identify errant companies. More than a decade later, obtaining verified, legally admissible data across sovereign borders remains an uphill battle.
Under a criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, cross-border data gaps can still derail a prosecution. That is why the criminal track alone cannot carry the burden of deterrence.
Statutory Civil Penalty Regime
The most critical mechanism in this Bill is therefore the new civil penalty regime under Part 2D. This represents a much-needed structural shift, empowering the NEA to seek penalties in court on the lower threshold of the balance of probabilities.
This civil penalty mechanism did not emerge in a vacuum. It directly responds to the deep public frustration over the limits of relying solely on criminal prosecutions that have yielded zero convictions in over a decade.
Informed by discussions with on how our financial regulations handle corporate deterrence, I filed a Parliamentary Question on 22 October, prior to the publication of this Bill, asking whether the Government would consider introducing amendments to the Act to establish a statutory civil penalty regime and empower the NEA to seek civil penalties on the balance of probabilities. I am glad that the Government has listened to these collective voices and incorporated this pragmatic tool into the law.
Now that this framework is before us, how does the Government intend to operationalise it? What specific investigative capabilities and legal resources will be allocated to ensure the NEA is fully equipped to aggressively pursue civil penalties in court and recover these judgment debts against errant entities?
Benchmarking Against the Securities and Futures Act
The procedural mechanics of this civil (penalty) regime, from settlement frameworks to corporate floors, are drawn almost word-for-word from Section 232 of the Securities and Futures Act. Yet the Government conspicuously omitted the SFA’s key deterrent: a dynamic penalty of up to three times the illicit profits gained.
Instead, Section 8K imposes a fixed $10 million ceiling. For multi-billion-dollar plantation conglomerates, where the cost savings of skimping on water management and fire suppression across vast concessions far exceed that figure, a capped $10 million penalty risks being priced in as an acceptable cost of doing business.
More fundamentally, the commercial upside extends far beyond short-term operational savings. By cutting corners on land clearing and drainage, companies can plant cash crops months ahead of schedule. That shortcut unlocks decades of lucrative oil palm and pulpwood harvests, while leaving behind an extreme fire hazard.
Why should our civil penalty regime ignore these illicit economic windfalls? If we adopt the SFA multiplier, the formula should expressly define "profit gained" to capture the commercial returns and crop yields generated from cultivating land prepared through improper or hazardous methods. Stripping away the long-term commercial upside of that converted land is a critical way to destroy the underlying financial incentive.
Leaving profit disgorgement solely to the criminal track under Section 16A blunts deterrence by subjecting it to the far higher criminal standard of proof.
Even if the Government chooses not to adopt the SFA's dynamic multiplier formula, why cap the civil penalty at $10 million, which is half the maximum criminal fine under Section 9? By setting the civil cap so much lower, we effectively offer errant conglomerates a 50% discount on their maximum financial exposure simply because cross-border evidential hurdles make a criminal trial unviable. Because those cross-border hurdles are so steep, I anticipate that the civil track will effectively become our primary enforcement mechanism. Its maximum financial exposure should at least match the $20 million criminal ceiling.
Tackling the Root Cause: Peatland Drainage
Next, I turn to one of the primary root causes of the fires: peatland drainage.
Peatlands are naturally waterlogged, carbon-rich wetlands. To prepare these lands for industrial plantations, agribusinesses excavate vast networks of canals to drain the water away. Once dried out, the organic peat soil becomes an underground tinderbox.
Because subterranean peat deposits do not respect surface concession boundaries, fires burning deep underground are notoriously difficult to track, contain or attribute to a single landholder after they ignite.
That is precisely why enforcement cannot wait for open flames. The law must treat deliberate canal excavation that turns wetlands into tinderboxes with the same urgency as the fires that inevitably follow.
The Bill appears to capture this indirectly through Sections 5, 6, 9, 11B and Part 2B. However, indirect mechanisms leave room for legal contestation. Can the Minister clarify whether the legislative intent of this Bill is to treat commercial peatland drainage and canal desiccation per se as conduct that causes or contributes to fire risk under Sections 5 and 6?
Will the Government consider expanding subsidiary regulations to require concession holders with a Singapore nexus to maintain mandatory water-table baselines? These entities should be required to submit audited fire prevention plans directly to the NEA, backed by independent third-party verification of their water management measures.
If such canals are discovered, for example using satellite triggers, is the Director-General prepared to proactively issue remedial directives under Section 11B to mandate canal blocking and peat re-wetting, to act well before fires break out?
Mobilising Financial and Capital Market Levers
Mr Deputy Speaker, Singapore may not be able to directly police overseas concessions, but as a major financial centre and commodities trading hub, we host the capital markets, trade financing pipelines and banking infrastructure that regional commodity groups rely upon.
The new designation powers under Part 2B and Section 8E allow the Government to shut off trade credit, working capital and commercial contracts for errant groups and their supply chains. We must actively use these financial and regulatory tools to ensure our markets are not facilitating environmentally destructive operations that cause severe personal and community health hazards, not just in Singapore but for our neighbours as well.
Under Part 2B, the Minister can designate errant concession holders and their supply chain partners. Will MAS issue supervisory expectations requiring financial institutions to review and restrict credit to these designated entities? Furthermore, will MAS and SGX RegCo bar listed companies linked to these fires from raising capital in our markets until their fire-risk management is independently audited?
Sir, agribusiness conglomerates rely on trade facilities, letters of credit and working capital from Singapore banks to export their harvests. If local lenders provide unchecked credit, or if listed vehicles raise public funds while their subsidiaries desiccate peatlands, our statutory penalties become a trivial overhead. We must put strict environmental conditions at the heart of commercial credit. As Singapore grows as a trusted green finance hub, our capital markets should reward genuine sustainability rather than bankroll environmental harm.
Bilateral Cooperation
Finally, legal deterrence must be matched by constructive bilateral cooperation with the affected countries to tackle this problem at its root.
Like many Singaporeans, I share the deep frustration over the persistent recurrence of this environmental and public health crisis over the past five decades since transboundary haze first affected our region in the 1970s. Singapore must always be united and firm when defending our vital national interests, whether on cross-border pollution or the sanctity of essential energy contracts.
However, managing cross-border environmental challenges between close neighbours is inherently complex and sensitive. There is a crucial difference between standing firm on national principles and letting public exchanges degenerate into counterproductive noise. As we saw following the remarks made in mid-October, public back-and-forth can quickly be amplified by vocal online commentators into acrimonious rhetoric that inflames bilateral sentiment. Such online polarisation generates unnecessary static, risks crowding out constructive dialogue and does little to clear the air.
I was therefore glad that the Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Jakarta from 27 to 29 October to engage directly with the Indonesian leadership. As he rightly pointed out, "You can't conduct diplomacy just by the phone or through the media."
The establishment of a joint task force with Indonesia to investigate companies linked to these fires is a constructive step forward. However, its success will depend on sustained commitment at the highest levels, seamless inter-agency coordination and a robust legal framework to translate bilateral findings into domestic enforcement action.
To ensure this joint task force delivers tangible outcomes, can the Minister share more details on its specific terms of reference? Which frontline and legal enforcement agencies will represent both sides? Will this bilateral framework include formal protocols for real-time ground verification and evidential data-sharing, so that joint findings can be admitted in court proceedings under this Act?
Fire Suppression at Source
Diplomatic coordination must also translate into effective fire suppression at source.
I recognise the immense scale and logistical complexity of peatland management across hundreds of thousands of hectares, as well as the tireless efforts of Indonesian frontline agencies and local community fire crews working under perilous conditions.
On 10 October, the acting spokesman for Indonesia's National Disaster Mitigation Agency noted that ground personnel would be preferred over aircraft because thick haze impairs aerial visibility. Yesterday, I raised a supplementary question asking whether Singapore is equipped to deploy ground teams for peat fires. In response, the Minister reiterated that our assistance offer has not yet been accepted, though that left my central question on our readiness unanswered.
While respecting that deployment decisions rest entirely with our neighbours, operational readiness remains essential. Can the Minister clarify whether Singapore has the specialised ground capabilities required to complement local efforts against deep subterranean peat fires if a mutual request for assistance is activated?
Public funds spent mobilising fire suppression assets should not be borne entirely by Singapore taxpayers when culpable corporate actors can be made to pay. Will the Government ensure that these public operational expenses are factored into the civil penalties sought under Part 2D, or the criminal disgorgement orders under Section 16A, when taking action against errant entities?
Conclusion
Mr Speaker, statutes are only as effective as their enforcement. Errant agribusinesses will only stop burning when doing so carries immediate commercial friction, when credit conditions tighten and when the financial markets they depend on are closed to them.
At the same time, domestic legal and financial levers must be paired with steady, constructive and mature diplomacy with our neighbours, working as collaborative partners rather than trading barbs through the media.
The true test of this legislation will be whether we have the ability to hit polluters directly in their wallets, sever their access to capital in Singapore and back that up with practical operational cooperation to douse the fires at source.
Sir, I support the Bill.
