Mr deputy Speaker,
The start of the COVID-19 pandemic six years ago was probably the first time when many realized how fragile our supply chains could be, after borders were sealed and international movement was heavily curtailed.
We are especially vulnerable to such disruptions given that we import more than 90% of our food supply. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the war in Iran this year have been further shocks to global supply chains.
On top of that, food production is facing unprecedented challenges as extreme weather becomes more common with climate change. This may mean a future where food resources may be jealously guarded by producers and subject to various export restrictions.
As my honourable friend Mr Dennis Tan highlighted in his speech, food security is fundamentally a matter of national security.
While the diversification of overseas food sources remains essential – and here, I would like to acknowledge the Government’s efforts to increase our food supply sources from 140 countries and regions two decades ago to 187 in 2024 – I believe that to increase our food security, we must strengthen our local agricultural ecosystem, increase our capabilities to produce manufactured foodstuffs and position Singapore as a food trading hub while simultaneously expanding community-based rescue networks to support our most vulnerable households.
To secure our local food supply, we must first look at how we treat our local farms.
Today, Singapore produces about a third of all eggs consumed and 3 percent of vegetables consumed. Local production meets about 8% of our fibre consumption and 25% of our protein consumption, as of 2025.
Our initial “30 by 30” target to produce 30 per cent of Singapore’s nutritional needs by 2030 was dropped last year amid falling local food production over the years. While egg production increased impressively, vegetable production fell from 23,500 tonnes in 2021 to 16,600 tonnes in 2025, while seafood production fell from 5,100 tonnes in 2021 to 3,800 tonnes in 2025.
If we are to meet the revised targets of producing 20 percent of our fibre and 30 percent of our protein locally by 2035, we need to closely examine whether existing land policies are adequate for these ambitions.
Consider the recent land policy decisions in Lim Chu Kang.
In August, I filed a Parliamentary Question asking the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment about the rationale for land-use changes in the region, specifically why long-standing farms like Bollywood Farms were required to vacate within the year, while neighboring farms were permitted to operate for another decade.
The Ministry responded that land optimization is necessary to consolidate military training land for MINDEF in the South of Lim Chu Kang and co-locate food and non-food farms in the North of Lim Chu Kang.
We were told that because existing tenancies were simply expiring rather than being terminated early, and had been notified since 2020 that no further lease renewals would be granted, the affected farms were given sufficient lead time to prepare for the transition. But if the Government cannot consolidate all of its land holdings in the south of Lim Chu Kang for another 10 years, what is preventing us from letting the three affected farms carry on their work for another 10 years?
These are farms that want to stay but are not being given the chance to stay on. At the same time, we see other farmers that have voluntarily closed up shop in recent years because of competitive headwinds. This is a great pity.
What is preventing us from letting the three affected farms continue staying in place for the next 10 years if there is no immediate need for the land that they are occupying now?
While land optimization is important, I believe that our current approach does not provide farmers with enough consideration for the fact that agriculture relies on long horizons.
Since 2016, all new agricultural land has been tendered out on 20-year leases by the Government. But as an example, the owner of one of the three affected farms in Lim Chu Kang told CNA that it took him six years to grow and successfully breed his Arowana fish.
Soil enrichment, modern crop cycle management, and high-tech agritech investments require vast capital up front. These investments may not yield returns over a 3-year or 5-year lease.
Seng Choon, for instance, had invested about S$3 million over the past three years in artificial intelligence and automation to improve the efficiency of its quality control processes and reduce the physical workload on senior workers. While it is not one of the affected farms that has to move out by the end of this year, it will also have to move out in September 2036 once its lease expires.
While we do not know the depreciation lifecycle of Seng Choon’s investments, this is an example of how investments made by Singapore farmers can amount to nothing if their land is acquired by the State.
Can the Government consider tendering out agricultural land on longer leases of 30 years or 20+20 years, provided that these leases are tied to clear production targets and periodic reviews to ensure that the farmers are meeting KPIs?
We should provide farmers with long-term assurance over their tenancies and whether they will face land acquisition during their lease, so that farmers can justify large investments into modern automation, high-yield vertical systems, or sustainable practices that will allow them to scale up production.
At the same time, farmers should share an understanding with the Government that they need to be commercially viable and scale up their production to meet our nation’s food security needs.
To further support farmers, the Government can also consider introducing minimum “Buy Local” requirements for food served in places such as army camps and schools, especially for industries that are facing falling production levels year after year such as vegetables and seafood.
Over time, these requirements can be wound down to ensure that local farms remain commercially viable without Government support.
This would be a strategic investment by the Government to support vegetable and fish farms that are finding it difficult to compete on price but are still needed to ensure that Singapore continues to have this strategic capacity.
Sir, my next suggestion to position Singapore as a food hub will not require any adjustments to land policy.
At a time of widespread fuel supply disruptions earlier this year, Singapore was still able to import an unprecedented volume of refined products because we had the foresight to position ourselves as a key oil and gas refinery hub and oil trading hub decades ago.
We can apply parts of the petrochemical model to food and expand our role as a food manufacturing, processing, trading, and transshipment hub in the region, so that food products, like fuel products, will always pass through Singapore regardless of supply shocks.
In 2025, Singapore’s re-exports of fish, seafood, vegetables and fruit amounted to some $520 million. This figure appears quite small compared to other food transshipment hubs such as the Netherlands, which is the primary re-export hub for fresh fruits and vegetables for Europe through the Port of Rotterdam, and re-exported agricultural products with a total value of 49 billion euros in 2025.
Does the Government have a strategy to strengthen Singapore’s position as a regional re-export hub for agricultural products and increase the value of such products passing through Singapore?
Additionally, we could do more to position ourselves as a strategic industrial food manufacturer.
As of 2024, Singapore’s food manufacturing sector comprises over 1,500 companies employing around 68,000 workers and contributing about 1 per cent of GDP. We can do more to consolidate ourselves as a hub in this area, similar to what we are doing for semiconductors and biomedical sciences.
Our strengths in pharmaceuticals, precision manufacturing, food science, and logistics overlap strongly with the direction modern food manufacturing is moving.
For example, Singapore already has ScaleUp Bio, a contract development and manufacturing operation for microbial and precision fermentation, backed by ADM and Temasek-owned Nurasa.
Last year, Nestlé expanded its Nestlé R&D Center Singapore to focus on alternative proteins, including hybrid plant/dairy and plant-based products, with support from EDB.
Suppose we deliberately increased our food manufacturing sector such that we have the capacity to produce several multiples of domestic food consumption. During peacetime, most of this output would normally be exported. But during a crisis, we would enjoy the same resilience benefit that we get from being an oil refining hub.
The Government should consider an industrial food cluster, similar to our petrochemical cluster on Jurong Island, producing millions of tonnes of noodles, rice products, milk powder, and frozen prepared meals, as the next step in our national security.
Given that the coordination of many agencies will be required to increase our food security, the Government should also consider setting up an inter-agency task force to strengthen our position as a regional food manufacturing, processing, trading, and transshipment hub.
Finally, Mr Speaker, securing our food future is not just about producing and importing more; it is also about maximizing what we already have.
In 2025, we generated almost 800,000 tonnes of food waste.
At the same time, low-income households, seniors living alone, and vulnerable families struggle with rising grocery costs and food insecurity.
Bridging this gap requires a coordinated, nationwide food rescue ecosystem.
While community organizations, non-profits, and volunteer groups do heroic work rescuing unsold produce from hawker centers, supermarkets, and distributors, they often operate with limited resources and logistical constraints.
For example, in the Kaki Bukit division of Aljunied GRC, some of my residents have been diligently organising themselves weekly for several years already, to receive and distribute rescued vegetables from The Red Collective.
The Red Collective itself was formed by a small group of Singaporeans five years ago because they are passionate about providing for the food insecure in the lower income communities and fighting food wastage. The Red Collective’s movement has grown to now involve over 100 volunteers who collect vegetables, bread and other food items on a daily basis using their own resources, energy and ingenuity, distributing to many locations all around Singapore.
I am further heartened to find that there are more of such groups that exist in the community, with pockets of energy by residents doing food rescue and redistribution. For example, multiple divisions in Sengkang GRC have weekly food rescues. A number of these groups even cross share their collection to ensure better distribution to as many as possible. They share their struggles too, one of which is the high cost of logistics in Singapore to move large quantities of donated food.
The Government can do more to support by providing financial grants and logistical support to encourage the growth of more of these ground-up initiatives.
A Government-run centralized platform connecting local food businesses directly with neighborhood food rescue charities could also help ensure that excess food reaches those who need it more rapidly.
Rescuing food addresses two challenges at once: it reduces our carbon footprint and provides immediate, dignity-preserving relief to Singaporeans hardest hit by the rising cost of living.
Sir, in conclusion, food security is an interconnected policy domain involving land use, technology, community action, and social welfare.
To ensure every Singaporean family has affordable food on their table regardless of external crises, we must give our farmers the land stability they need to innovate; expand our role as a food manufacturing, processing, trading, and transshipment hub; and build robust public-civil partnerships to eliminate food waste.
I support the Motion.
