Mr Speaker,
The Workers’ Party does not dispute the administrative case for this bill. The Infocomm Media Development Authority already regulates both the media and telecommunications sectors. Drawing on a common framework across both is defensible on efficiency grounds. We accept that.
But the argument goes further. Because digital delivery has converged—because newspapers and broadcasters now reach audiences over the same networks as telephone companies—the government says they should be subject to the same regulatory powers. I find it difficult to accept this prima facie without deeper scrutiny. The delivery mechanism may be shared. The nature of what is being regulated is not.
The bill introduces three significant new powers: a proactive directions regime under new section 61A, an ownership approval regime under new section 65, and a ministerial separation order under new section 69A.
My concern is this: this bill is not about the media landscape as it exists. It is about the one that has not yet arrived—a future where genuinely independent media might grow in reach and maturity. And my fear is that this bill is written to foreclose that future before it has the chance to arrive.
Part one: A press regulation regime, without press safeguards
Mr Speaker, the case for regulating telecommunications carrier ownership rests on a concrete harm. The infrastructure—cables, spectrum, exchange points—is neutral. If a single actor controls it, others are locked out. Regulating ownership is proportionate to that.
Press regulation is different. Newspapers and broadcasters make editorial choices: what to investigate, what to publish, whose voice to amplify. The power to shape public discourse is categorically different from the power to route a data packet.
A press regulation regime needs press safeguards. Editorial independence on the face of the statute, so the regime cannot reach what a publication chooses to investigate or publish. Plurality conditions on ownership approvals, designed to protect diversity of voice. Higher proportionality when restricting a press entity than a telecommunications operator. Independent review on the merits, when a media entity is singled out by the executive. Transparency around designations.
This bill contains none of these. It takes the structural toolkit designed for network operators—ownership approvals, proactive directions, separation orders—and applies it to entities that produce speech.
Competition concerns, really?
Mr Speaker, the government will likely say this bill is about promoting competition. Let me examine that framing.
Our two major media companies—SPH Media Trust and Mediacorp—are both government-linked, both already within the government’s orbit formally and informally. Extending regulatory powers over entities already in that orbit does not meaningfully change the competitive dynamics.
The more significant read of this bill is as a pre-emptive measure. Not about managing the existing players. About ensuring that no new actor—a well-capitalised private investor, a media group with genuine editorial independence—can build a meaningful presence outside the government’s reach.
Think of Apple Daily in Hong Kong. Or the Washington Post. Both were funded by individuals with deep pockets and strong political convictions of their own—Jimmy Lai and Jeff Bezos are not politically neutral figures. But their convictions were theirs, not their government’s. That is precisely what made their publications independently powerful: they could ask hard questions without needing permission from whoever held office.
The designation power in section 59(1) is the instrument for pre-empting that possibility here. The Minister can designate any newspaper publisher or broadcaster as a ‘regulated person’ on no published criteria, and bring the full weight of this regime to bear—ownership vetting, proactive ‘public interest’ directions, and if needed, compulsory transfer of business.
Singapore does have independent media that fall outside the state's orbit. Among them is Jom, founded in 2022. It publishes long-form journalism on Singapore’s society, politics, and policy. As of October last year, it had around 8,000 paying subscribers—I am one of them. It is not funded by advertising or any government-linked body. It scrapes by because readers choose to pay for serious journalism.
It has yet to flourish, it remains small.
Jom is an online publication, on a wide reading, it may fall within the scope of the bill. If Jom were ever designated under section 59, all three new powers would apply. Any investor acquiring 30% or more of Jom would need IMDA’s prior approval. IMDA could issue proactive directions to Jom on ‘public interest’ grounds left undefined in the statute, with no proportionality test and consultation waivable at IMDA’s discretion. And the Minister could order its business transferred to another entity—with compensation the Minister determines, subject to no independent review on the merits.
This bill is not written for Jom as it stands today. It is written for what Jom—or a publication like it—might become in ten years. A publication with the reach to shape conversations. To hold power to account. To be read by Singaporeans because it has earned their trust.
That is the future this bill appears to be written to foreclose. A future when Singapore has a genuinely independent press—publications that owe their survival to their readers, not to the goodwill of any government, that can ask hard questions of whoever holds power, including of us.
If this is not the bill’s intent, I urge the government to clarify.
Part two: Three powers, no guardrails
Mr Speaker, the bill’s three new powers rest on a common foundation: designation. Under section 59(1), the Minister may designate any newspaper publisher or broadcasting licensee as a ‘regulated person’—bringing it within the scope of all three powers—on no published criteria, subject to no external review. The Minister selects who is regulated, entirely at the Minister’s discretion. That selection is the gateway to everything that follows.
Section 61A—proactive directions. IMDA may issue proactive directions to regulated persons to ensure fair market conduct, effective competition, and—simply—’in the public interest.’ That last ground is left entirely undefined. A direction under section 61A(2)(a) may require a regulated person to do or refrain from doing anything specified—there is no limit on subject matter in the text. Consultation may be waived whenever IMDA considers it ‘not practicable or desirable.’ No proportionality requirement. No obligation to give written reasons.
During the consultation process on this bill, two law firms filed responses on precisely these gaps. Their concerns have not been substantially addressed.
Section 65—ownership approvals. Any person acquiring 30% or more of a regulated media company now requires IMDA’s prior approval. The definitions of ‘control’ and ‘associate’ are broad—capturing informal arrangements, oral agreements, and trusts. There are no materiality thresholds. A standard minority investor protection is treated the same as an acquisition of effective control. The chilling effect on investment in small, independent publications is not incidental to this drafting. It is its foreseeable consequence.
Section 69A—a ministerial separation order. The Minister may compel a media company to transfer its entire business to another entity. Compensation is discretionary—the Minister ‘may’ award it, not ‘must.’ It may be denied entirely if the Minister finds anti-competitive conduct—a finding the Minister also makes. The separation order is final.
One decision-maker. At every stage. On every question. No independent check on the merits of any of it. When we debated the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act, I raised a structurally identical concern. In that bill, the powers at least sat with a statutory Commissioner, not a Minister. I proposed an appeal to the High Court on three limited grounds. The government declined.
The same structural choice reappears here. Compulsory restructuring of media businesses, with the Minister at every decision point and no appeal on the merits available to any court.
The powers inscribed in this bill will not belong to this government alone. They sit on the books for every future government, every future Minister, in every future Parliament. Parliament should ask itself whether it is comfortable with that—whoever holds power.
Part three: How a prospective future of a flourishing independent media landscape is foreclosed
Mr Speaker, let me explain the mechanism by which this bill forecloses the future I described—without a single direction ever being issued, without a single separation ever being ordered.
These powers do not need to be exercised to do their work.
A rational investor who wants to fund serious, independent journalism in Singapore will read this bill. They will ask: can IMDA issue a direction to this publication on ‘public interest’ grounds I cannot define in advance, with no proportionality test, no written reasons, and no independent appeal on the merits? The answer appears to be yes. Can the Minister order the business transferred, determining compensation unilaterally, on a finding of anti-competitive conduct the Minister also makes? If the entity is designated, again, yes.
At that point, the investment does not happen. The newsroom does not expand. The publication does not grow.
This is how unconstrained statutory powers work. They do not need to be exercised. They only need to exist, in plain legal language, for any investor doing a risk assessment to conclude: not here. Not under these conditions.
IMDA acknowledged the weight of this in its own 2022 consultation closing note. It stated that structural separation requirements ‘may impose significant costs and should only be exercised in very exceptional circumstances.’ SMS Tan has also assured us today that this would be used as a matter of last resort. The proof will be in its application.
Six questions for the Minister
Mr Speaker, I have six questions.
First, on designation. Section 59(1) allows the Minister to designate any newspaper publisher or broadcasting licensee as a ‘regulated person’ on no published criteria. What criteria will govern which entities are designated? Will those criteria be published before any designation is made? And will the same criteria apply equally to government-linked and independently owned entities?
Second, on the scope of designation. A ‘regulated person’ under section 59(1) includes the ‘holder of a broadcasting licence.’ Does that reach social media companies, including large foreign players with a local presence? Furthermore, would blogs, social media accounts, podcasts and so on be covered? If so, will the Government publish the criteria that would govern designation?
Third, on ‘in the public interest.’ Section 61A(1)(c) permits IMDA to issue proactive directions simply ‘in the public interest.’ The term is undefined. Will the Minister commit to published criteria for when this ground will be invoked? And will the Minister confirm on the record that directions under section 61A will not reach the editorial or informational conduct of a regulated person?
Fourth, on transferee selection. When the Minister issues a separation order under section 69A, the Minister may direct transfer to a ‘separate entity’—which need not be independent. Given the structure of Singapore’s media market, the realistic candidates for a transferee are government-linked bodies. What constraints govern the choice of transferee? Can the Minister confirm that a compulsorily separated media business will not be directed to a government-linked entity without the agreement of the regulated person?
Fifth, on compensation. Compensation under section 69A(8) is discretionary. It may be denied entirely if the Minister finds anti-competitive conduct under section 69A(11)—a finding the Minister makes, having already ordered the separation. What principles govern this determination? And what safeguard exists against that finding being used to deny compensation to an entity whose business the Minister has already compelled to transfer?
Sixth, on the newspaper permit. Following separation, the new entity must reapply for a newspaper permit under section 69A(3)(b)(ii). The existing permit does not transfer. The government decides whether to grant the new one. Can the Minister confirm that a permit will not be withheld from an entity that has already been compulsorily separated under a ministerial order? And will there be published criteria governing when a permit application following separation may be refused?
Conclusion
Mr Speaker, I earlier said I hoped for a day when Singapore has a genuinely independent press of scale and stature.
That day has not come. But the conditions that will make it possible are things Singapore can build. It will not happen automatically. It will only happen if we make deliberate choices to build safeguards into our legislative architecture, not simply to rely on the goodwill of whoever holds office.
And that is why I hope that the Minister can give us reassurance today, that this bill is intended to build a regulatory architecture for the press that is designed to make a future of independent, trusted journalism more reachable, not to close it off before it has the chance to arrive.
