While the Bill amends many Acts, I will focus on 2 sets of amendments – those concerning Criminal Procedure Code and the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act.
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)
Clause 21 (a) to (c) of the Bill amends the CPC with respect to bail.
Clause 21 (b) of the Bill amends S 95(1)(a) to allow a court to consider whether to release an arrested person on bail in all cases except where the accused is charged with an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
The provision, when amended, will allow a court to grant bail where an accused is charged with an offence which attracts imprisonment of 20 years or more, which the current provision does not allow. I support this amendment, as it will give a court the discretion to decide whether to grant bail in such cases. The court can then apply the usual principles in deciding whether to grant or deny bail to an accused, looking at factors such as the seriousness of the offence and punishment, the risk of the accused absconding and the risk of further offences being committed while he is released on bail.
This amendment in Clause 21 (b) also rectifies an issue which recently arose in the case of Mohamed Hisham bin Sapandi v PP [2011] 4 SLR 868. There, the prosecution and the defence had argued that the wording of the existing S 95(1)(a) was capable of two different interpretations, as the term “20 years or more” was ambiguous. In any event, the problematic clause will now been deleted.
Sir, since we are discussing S 95, there has been an issue surrounding this section which would be good to clarify in this debate.
S 95 (1) restricts the court in granting bail in 3 situations: first, where the accused is charged with an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment; secondly, where he is a proven flight risk and the court believes he will continue to be so; and thirdly, where is arrested or taken into custody under warrants issued under the Extradition Act.
The issue of whether these restrictions under S 95 (1) apply to only the Subordinate Courts or to the High Court as well arose in Mohamed Hisham’s case. This is because there is an unqualified provision in S 97 (1) of the CPC which allows the High Court to grant bail to any accused before it, or release him on personal bond, or to vary the amount or conditions of bail or bond required by a police officer or a Subordinate Court, as it thinks fit.
In Mohamed Hisham’s case, even the Deputy Public Prosecutors appeared to accept that the High Court’s power to grant or vary bail under S 97 was not fettered by S 95. This view was accepted by the High Court in Mohamed Hisham’s case. However, it was noted there that there had been an earlier, conflicting High Court decision in S Selvamsylvester v PP [2005] 4 SLR 409 which held that the High Court’s power to grant bail was subject to the restrictions in the equivalent sections of the former CPC.
As the High Court appears to be grappling with what Parliament’s intention is in enacting the bail provisions under the old and new CPC, could this Bill have included an amendment to clarify the position once and for all? Or would Minister assist at least to clarify what Parliament’s intention is on this issue?
Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (MOA)
Under Clause 28 of the Bill, the Commissioner of Police may authorize any person or class of persons to possess truncheons, handcuffs or specified weapons or equipment in a public place, if the Commissioner deems it necessary and appropriate.
This amendment widens the already worrying S 22A of the Act, which allows the Commissioner to authorize persons in the private security industry to carry such items in public. The existing S 22A was inserted in Aug 2007 and at that Parliamentary debate, I raised my concern about giving private security personnel such items, when they did not have police powers, nor receive the same training. Some of these items are meant for use in physical confrontations with members of the public. As security officers generally have only citizen’s powers, which are limited, the risk of use of excessive force will arise. Should security officers become overzealous, or even act in good faith but cause injury to the public, will the citizen be left simply to sue the individual security officer and his employer?
In other countries, the accountability of private security officers for wrongful acts has been a big issue, and it is a matter of time I feel before this surfaces here.
Now, Clause 28 proposes to widen the provision even further. The amendment will allow the Commissioner of Police to include any person or class of persons to carry truncheons, handcuffs, or specified weapons and equipment. This new provision raises even more concerns.
I would like Minister to clarify which categories of people Commissioner has in mind for this provision, and what safeguards are in place to protect the public against excessive force or abuse.