by MP for Aljunied GRC, Sylvia Lim
[Delivered in Parliament on 13 Aug 2013]
I rise in support of the Bill, which will update and better co-ordinate our efforts to tackle terrorist financing. However, I have some queries on the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the framework, which I shall elaborate on later in my speech.
The 9-11 attacks by Al-Qaida in the United States in 2001 and the Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 2002 awakened the world to the ascendancy of terrorists across the globe. Governments worldwide mounted massive and co-ordinated crackdowns. In Singapore and Malaysia, arrests were made of suspected terrorists in 2001 and 2002, which have been assessed to have “crushed” the JI Division in Singapore and Malaysia at the time (Jones 2005). Al-Qaida had also been battered by counter-terrorism operations by the US and other governments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2002, this House also passed the parent Bill – the Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, as part of a global effort to tackle terrorist financing.
Just as the situation appeared to be somewhat under control, more recent events show that terrorist groups may go through periods of malaise, but are capable of regeneration and resurgence and should not be written off. Within the last two weeks, the United States government detected chatter among high-level persons from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula talking about a major attack, leading to the closure of several US embassies and consulates in the Middle-East. Closer to home, sporadic terror attacks in June and July this year have occurred in Sulawesi and Java by persons with links to JI and Al-Qaida (Otto and Hariyanto, 2013).
It is clear that our counter-terrorism efforts must continue, and a key component to tackle is financing. Financing enables terrorist groups to survive and thrive, and to fund their recruitment, training, operations and even public outreach.
The task of suppressing terrorist financing is a challenging one, as such individuals or groups solicit and transfer funds through various channels which are difficult to track. Often, groups get financing through front companies or legitimate welfare or humanitarian organizations. For instance, JI reportedly received funds from abroad via cash couriers, remittance and gold shops, donations, front companies making purchases diverted for JI’s use, and collections from Muslims and Muslim charities (Abuza 2003). Given that terrorism financing involves multiple, informal and even nefarious channels, are we able to gauge whether the Act has had any tangible effect in suppressing terrorist financing in Singapore since it was enacted more than ten years ago? For instance, how many prosecutions have been carried out since the Act came into force in 2003? Are there other indicators the government is tracking?
The United Nations Security Council has also acknowledged that the existing sanctions on terrorist financing could be strengthened, and has indicated that it would try to do so by June 2014. Is Singapore engaged in this review process? Would Minister be able to tell us what general directions are currently being studied by the UN?
I now turn to queries on two clauses in the Bill.
Clause 2 of the Bill amends the definition of “terrorist” and “terrorist entities”. These will now cover all individuals and groups listed by the United Nations Security Council in the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions List, as updated from time to time at the UN’s official website. The individuals or groups listed are recommended by the UN to be subject to asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes as set out in Security Council Resolution 2083 (2012). The UN Framework also builds in a check and balance in the Office of Ombudsman, who will assess requests for individuals or entities on the List to be de-listed.
Given Singapore’s past experience of being a target of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), it is good to note that the JI is on the UN’s Al-Qaida List. The links between Al-Qaida and JI are clear and had been cemented by Hambali, a JI elite who is a member of Al-Qaida; Hambali had arranged for Al Qaida to fund JI and train them in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to school young members of JI families in radicalized madrassahs in Pakistan (Jones 2005). Also on the UN list is JI’s younger cousin Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), founded in 2008 by one of the co-founders of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir; the JAT has been linked to several terrorist acts in the past 2 years in Indonesia.
I have a concern regarding the comprehensiveness of the UN Lists. In the wake of the JI arrests in Singapore in 2001 and 2002, our MHA had put out a White Paper on the JI in 2003. The White Paper carried a chart showing the links between Al-Qaida and the JI, which also implicated two other groups – the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and the Filipino Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). MHA stated then that KMM had hosted 911 Al-Qaida suicide bombers and helped JI procure ammonium nitrate for making explosives. As for MILF, MHA stated that they had received funding from Al-Qaida, conducted training of Singapore JI detainees in Mindanao and even directed the Singapore detainees to target US establishments for attack. Given the active and significant roles of both KMM and MILF at the time, I was surprised that these groups were not specifically listed in the UN Al-Qaida List. Is there a reason for the exclusion? Has the risk / threat assessment changed, or is the evidence to prove the linkage to Al-Qaida insufficient? Will their exclusion make the UN list less effective?
My last query relates to exemptions given by the Minister under Section 7 of the Act.
Clause 4 amends Section 7 regarding when the Minister can exempt a person in Singapore, or any Singapore citizen outside Singapore, from certain prohibitions against transacting in property and services involving terrorist individuals or entities. The new Section 7 will allow the Minister to also exempt a person from Section 4(b) i.e. a person may be permitted to provide property and services to an individual terrorist but not to a terrorist entity. The Explanatory Note to the Bill states that supply to an individual terrorist may be allowed if the supply is not for a terrorist purpose.
The rationale for the change was explained (MHA statement of 8 July 2013) as to allow a terrorist and his family funds for basic necessities, as required by the humanitarian exception required under the UN Security Council Resolution. The Minister also mentioned rehabilitation as one of the aims. While the rationale is justified, I would like to know if there are any safeguards to ensure that the funds or other assets are not channeled to terrorist purposes, especially now that there is an auto-exemption. For instance, will there be follow-ups to account for how the monies are utilized?
Despite the queries I have raised, I support the Bill.
References:
Abuza, Z. (2003). Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: the financial
network of al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. Contemporary Southeast Asia
25:2, 169-199.
Jones, S. (2005). The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56:2. 169-178.
Otto, B. and Hariyanto, J. (2013). Indonesian police kill two
suspected terrorists, capture two others. Wall Street Journal, July
22, 2013. Available online, accessed Aug 11, 2013:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324783204578621222746773716.html